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Risk Management
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Physical Security and Cyber: Where Hospitals Lose the Thread

Hospitals are deliberately open buildings with network ports in public corridors. The controls that matter sit where physical access and network access meet — and nobody owns that boundary.

GuardsArm Team

Security Experts

December 28, 2025

Physical and cyber security

A hospital is designed to be entered. Visitors arrive at all hours, corridors connect public areas to clinical ones, and staff in scrubs are unremarkable because everyone is in scrubs. Most cyber security programmes assume a building with a controlled perimeter. Hospitals do not have one, and the place this matters most is a boundary nobody owns: physical security reports to facilities, cyber reports to IT, and the gap between them is where the risk sits.

Open by design
Public access is a requirement, not a weakness to remove
Ports everywhere
Network sockets in corridors, waiting areas and unlocked rooms
Split ownership
Facilities owns doors, IT owns networks, nobody owns the join

The live network port problem

Walk a corridor and count the wall sockets. In most hospitals a proportion are live, on a VLAN with real access, and reachable by anyone who sits down with a laptop for ten minutes.

The fix is network access control: a port authenticates the device before granting access, and an unrecognised device lands in a quarantine VLAN. That is the correct answer and it is a project.

Meanwhile, these are achievable now:

  • Disable unused ports administratively. Tedious, effective, needs no new product.
  • Port security by MAC count to stop someone unplugging a device and inserting a switch.
  • Move public-area ports to a guest VLAN with internet-only egress.
  • Sticky MAC on device ports so a swap raises an alert.
Test it rather than assume it
Take a laptop to a waiting-area socket and plug in. What you get — an address, an internal route, a domain controller — tells you more about your exposure than any documentation. It is a ten-minute test and the result is usually sobering.

Unattended workstations

The clinical workstation logged in and unattended is the most exploited physical-cyber gap in healthcare, and the solution is the same one that makes MFA workable — badge-driven session handling, covered in MFA in clinical workflows.

Short idle timeouts only work when there is a fast way back in. Without that, staff defeat the lock, and the control is worse than absent because it is believed to be working.


The badge system is a computer

Physical access control systems are networked applications, frequently running on older operating systems, frequently administered by facilities rather than IT, and frequently never included in the security programme at all.

QuestionWhy it matters
Is it on its own network segment?Compromise should not reach clinical systems, or vice versa
Who administers it, and with what credentials?Often a shared password held by a contractor
Is it patched?It is a server, whoever owns it
Are badge revocations tied to HR offboarding?Otherwise leavers keep physical access
Are access logs retained and reviewed?They are decisive during an investigation
Can badges be cloned?Older proximity formats can be copied in seconds

That last one deserves attention. Legacy 125 kHz proximity cards can be cloned with inexpensive equipment from a short distance. If your badge also authenticates to workstations, cloning it is both a physical and a logical compromise.


Correlate the two signals

The highest-value convergence control is comparing physical and logical access:

Correlating physical and logical accessA logon from a location the badge record says the person is not at is a high-confidence signal of shared or stolen credentials.Badge evententered building ALogon eventfrom building BCorrelatephysically impossibleAlertcredential likely shared or stolen
Also catches the reverse: a badge-in with no corresponding logon all shift.

Useful correlations:

  • Logon from a site the person has not badged into
  • Badge access to a restricted area outside that person's working pattern
  • Terminated employee badge use, which should be impossible and occasionally is not
  • Server room entry with no corresponding change ticket

Where to start

Two things, both cheap. First, the port test above. Second, pull the badge system into the security programme — ask who patches it and who holds the administrator credentials. In most hospitals both answers are uncomfortable, and both are fixable without a project.

GuardsArm assesses physical and cyber convergence in healthcare, including network port exposure and access control system review. Book a scoping call.

Written by GuardsArm Team

Our team of cybersecurity experts brings decades of combined experience in penetration testing, compliance auditing, and incident response. We're dedicated to helping organizations strengthen their security posture.

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