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What Is AI Security?

Definition

AI Security addresses the unique threats and vulnerabilities associated with artificial intelligence and machine learning systems, including adversarial attacks, model poisoning, data privacy, and the security of AI-driven decision-making.

People Also Ask

Common questions about AI Security answered by our security experts.

AI Security in Practice

Securing an AI system means defending things a conventional application security programme was never built to consider. The code may be sound, the infrastructure hardened and the access controls correct, and the system can still be manipulated through the one channel it exists to accept: its input.

That is the structural difference. Traditional software separates instructions from data — a parameterised query is exactly that separation. A model receives one stream and has no reliable mechanism for deciding which parts of it carry authority.

Behaviour is a distribution
Same input, different output — conventional testing assumes otherwise
Provenance is usually unknowable
You rarely know what a third-party model was trained on
Capability is the multiplier
Risk scales with what the model is allowed to do

The risk classes worth separating

Lumping these together produces a policy nobody can act on. They have different causes and different defences.

ClassWhen it happensWhat it looks like
Prompt injectionInferenceHostile instructions ride in on content the model reads
Adversarial evasionInferenceCrafted input makes the model classify wrongly
Model poisoningTrainingCompromised data or weights introduce a backdoor
Model theftEitherWeights or behaviour extracted through repeated queries
Data leakageEitherTraining data or another user's context surfaces in output
Supply chainBuildA pulled model, dataset or library is not what it claims

The first three have their own entries because the defences genuinely differ. Treating them as one problem called “AI risk” is why so many AI policies say nothing actionable.


Where the real exposure usually sits

For most organisations the pressing question is not whether a model can be tricked in a laboratory. It is what the model is permitted to do when it is.

Impact scales with capability, not clevernessThe same manipulation is a curiosity against a read-only assistant and a serious incident against one that can act.Read-only, output to one userMisleading output for that personRetrieval across a document storeCan surface records the user should not seeSending mail or messagesExfiltration, or action taken in someone’s nameCalling internal APIsWhatever those APIs permitAutonomous multi-step operationAll of the above with no human checkpoint
Untrusted input plus privileged capability plus no confirmation is the dangerous combination.

That is why the highest-value control is rarely a model-level defence. It is retrieval scoped to the individual user's permissions rather than a service account's, and human confirmation before anything consequential.


Governance that is proportionate

Not every AI feature warrants the same scrutiny. Triage on consequence: does the system affect a person's access to care, employment, credit, housing or legal position? Those need documented assessment, meaningful human oversight and a route to challenge a decision. A summarisation feature over public content does not.

Applying the heavy process everywhere guarantees it is applied nowhere, because teams route around it.

Start with the inventory, not the policy
Organisations building an AI register from procurement records find two or three systems. Organisations that ask teams what their tools actually do find twenty — the summarisation in the collaboration suite, the scoring in the recruitment tool, the assistant in the CRM. A policy written before that inventory governs an organisation you do not have.

The question that orders everything else

Before any framework or tooling decision, answer this: for each AI system, what happens if it is wrong, and who finds out? A model whose error produces a mildly unhelpful summary needs almost no governance. A model whose error denies someone care, credit or a job needs documented oversight and an appeal route. Most organisations have both and govern them identically, which is why the policy feels simultaneously burdensome and inadequate.

Where to start

List what your AI features can do without a human confirming. If anything on that list is consequential and also processes content from outside your organisation, put a confirmation step there. It is usually a small change and it removes most of the realistic damage.

Further reading: AI governance and ISO 42001, the questions that reveal how an AI vendor uses your data, and finding the tools staff already adopted. GuardsArm runs security risk assessments covering AI deployments.

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