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Vendor Risk
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Third-Party Remote Access: The Quiet Breach Path Into Hospitals

Dozens of vendors hold standing remote access to hospital systems, most of it installed at commissioning, shared, permanent and unmonitored. Brokering it without stopping support.

GuardsArm Team

Security Experts

November 25, 2025

Third-party remote access

A mid-sized hospital typically has dozens of vendors with remote access to internal systems — the EHR vendor, the imaging provider, laboratory instruments, pharmacy automation, building management, the dictation platform. Most of it was installed during commissioning, uses a shared account, is always on, and nobody is watching it.

It is one of the most reliable initial access paths into healthcare, and it is invisible on most asset inventories because it is a connection rather than a system.

Dozens of vendors
Each with a path in, most installed years ago
Shared credentials
One account used by whichever engineer picks up the ticket
Always on
Standing access that exists whether or not support is in progress

Inventory by evidence

Vendors will not tell you and documentation is incomplete. Find the connections:

  • Firewall rules permitting inbound from external addresses, and outbound persistent tunnels
  • Remote access tools installed on servers and clinical workstations — TeamViewer, AnyDesk, LogMeIn, vendor-specific agents
  • VPN accounts not tied to an employee
  • Accounts with a vendor name in the directory
  • Accounts payable — every supplier under a support contract is a candidate
  • Ask biomedical engineering, who commissioned much of it

Record per connection: vendor, what it reaches, method, who authorises, whether it is always on, whether sessions are logged, and whether a contract covers it.

Outbound tunnels are the ones you miss
Inbound rules are visible in the firewall. A vendor agent that dials out and holds a persistent connection looks like ordinary outbound traffic. Check what is installed on the endpoint, not just what the perimeter permits.

The target model

Brokered vendor accessAccess is opened on request for a bounded window, brokered through a jump host with session recording, and closed automatically rather than persisting.Vendor requestsvia ticketAccess openedtime-boxedSession brokeredthrough jump hostRecordedand monitoredClosedautomatically
The vendor still gets support access. What changes is that it exists only while needed.

Concretely:

  • Named individual accounts, never shared. If three engineers support you, that is three accounts.
  • MFA enforced, no exceptions for vendors
  • Just-in-time: access opens on an approved request and closes automatically
  • Brokered through a jump host rather than direct to the target system
  • Session recording for anything touching clinical systems or PHI
  • Scoped: the imaging vendor reaches imaging systems, nothing else

Handling the "our tool or no support" argument

Some vendors insist on their own remote access product as a condition of support. Options, in order of preference:

PositionApproach
BestTheir tool runs inside your brokered session, reaching only the target
GoodTheir tool permitted but disabled by default, enabled per request
AcceptableTheir tool always on, but network-restricted to specific hosts and fully logged
UnacceptableAlways on, unrestricted, shared credential, unlogged

Most vendors accept the second or third when asked directly. The first conversation is usually with a support engineer who will say no; the second, at account-management level and near renewal, usually goes differently.


Put it in the contract

Retrofitting is negotiating from weakness. New contracts and renewals should specify: named accounts, MFA, access on request rather than standing, session recording, notification of engineer departures, and scope limited to the supported system. Add it to the procurement template so it arrives by default.

This is the same principle applied to devices in IoMT security, and to identity in contractor identity governance.


Monitoring what you cannot yet broker

Brokering every connection takes months. In the meantime, these are worth alerting on and cost little:

  • Vendor account authentication outside a support window — if there is no open ticket, ask why someone connected
  • Access from a new source country or ASN for an established vendor
  • Lateral movement from a vendor jump point to a system outside their scope
  • Out-of-hours sessions, which are legitimate but should be visible
  • A vendor account used after the contract ended, which should be impossible

The first of these is the highest yield. Correlating vendor logons against open support tickets is straightforward and reliably finds connections nobody requested.

Ask vendors to tell you when engineers leave
A named vendor account should be disabled when that engineer moves on, and you will not know unless the contract requires notification. Without it, named accounts drift back toward shared ones as credentials are passed along informally.

Where to start

List every remote access tool installed across your servers and clinical workstations. Not firewall rules — installed software. Most hospitals find at least one they cannot account for, and that single list usually justifies the brokering project on its own.

GuardsArm inventories and re-platforms vendor remote access in clinical environments. Book a scoping call.

Written by GuardsArm Team

Our team of cybersecurity experts brings decades of combined experience in penetration testing, compliance auditing, and incident response. We're dedicated to helping organizations strengthen their security posture.

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